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Two Kinds of Political Awakening in the Civic Education Classroom
A Comparative Argumentation Analysis of the “Constitutional 
Debates” of Two “Found-a-Village” Projects with 8th Graders
This article proposes an adaption of the Toulmin model of argumentation as a congenial method to investigate 
interactive political learning processes. The interactive learning environment is provided by the “Found-a-Vil-
lage” project, where students simulate to establish their own social and political system. I will start my essay 
by introducing the “genetic” village-setting which works as a trigger for the formation of political judgment 
and conflict resolution skills. Then, I will define claims, grounds, warrants and premises as basic parts of Toul-
min’s model. After presenting six types of politically relevant warrants, I will present a four-level-model for the 
analysis of political learning processes, distinguishing private, public, institutional and systemic perspectives 
on politics. Later on, I apply this model by comparing two quite different classes during the initial phase of 
their village-projects: While the “public” class uses the simulation to seriously negotiate their political values, 
the second class takes a fairly playful and “private” time-out from typical instruction. Both classes, at a different 
speed, undergo a continual development from unfounded claims and inadequate arguments to the reflection of 
their own and opposed political value-orientations. The analysis of implicit parts of individual argumentation 
confirms the method to be helpful for teachers’ diagnosis skills.
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1.  The “found-a-village” project as trigger 
for controversial political debates 
What happens when 14-year-old German 8th graders 
simulate the foundation of their own village-communi-
ty in a fictitious desert mountain region far away from 
home? At any rate you can expect some lively and con-
troversial interaction. The village-project follows the 
idea of the genetic method, allowing students to study 
social issues in their “process of formation” (Dewey 
1966; Wagenschein 1991; for English translations see 
Westbury 2000 and http://www.natureinstitute.org/
txt/mw/index.htm). Therefore, the village represents 
a “point zero”, a political vacuum provoking the stu-
dents to fill it with their own political, economical and 
cultural ideas (see Petrik 2007, 2010 and 2011b). This 
starting point supports students to discover their la-
tent ideologies and the necessity of democratic rules 
and institutions to coordinate controversial claims. 
Thus, the simulation can be grouped within the 
tradition of “island-scenarios” or so-called “Robinson-
ades”. In Adelson’s (1971) famous study “The Political 
Imagination of the Young Adolescent” interviewed 
adolescents were asked to imagine a thousand people 
venture to an island to form a new society. Howev-
er, the village-scenario is more interactive and more 
“institutional”, offering traces of a traditional three-
class structure, a city hall, a prison, a market square, a 
church, a workshop and cropland. This “institutional 
scaffolding” animates students more likely to debate 
basic political issues (like government, social justice, 
economy, religion) without teacher invention, than 
the “naturalist” island does:
Fig. 1: Scenario of the “Found-a-Village” project (Petrik 2007, 2011b)
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Interactive political microcosms like the village are 
meant to foster critical judgment and conflict resolu-
tion skills. They are especially appropriate to fill what 
I call “the ideology gap” in Civic Education (see Petrik 
2010): The lack of effective, student-to-student, contro-
versial classroom-debates that engender and elaborate 
deep-rooted political values and ideologies (see e.g. 
Niemi, Niemi 2007; Hess, Ganzler 2007). Mainly I’m 
interested in students’ early traces of left-libertarian, 
market-liberal, democratic-socialist or conservative ar-
gumentation. Those four orientations are, following 
Kitschelt’s (1994) influential work, broadly considered 
as basic political ideologies shaping individual value-
systems, social movements and political parties. Hence, 
the following coordinate system based on Kitschelt’s 
model comprises the horizon of possible political 
thought in an ideal-typically way (see in detail Petrik 
2010):
Fig. 2: The political compass as horizon of political judgment (Petrik 2010)
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The horizon of political judgment is characterized by 
two major cleavages that each society has to take 
position on: the distributive or economic cleavage 
about resource allocation and the procedural, commu-
nitarian or socio-cultural one about actors, power and 
decision-making. The left “equality”-pole is defined 
as the view that assets should be redistributed by a 
cooperative collective agency (the state, in a demo-
cratic socialist tradition or a network of communes, 
in the left-libertarian or anarchist tradition). The right 
“liberty”-pole is defined as the view that the econo-
my should be left to the market system, to voluntary 
competing individuals and organizations. „Self-deter-
mination” describes the idea that personal freedom 
as well as voluntary and equal participation should be 
maximized. „Authority“ is defined as the belief that 
existing hierarchies and religious or secular traditions 
should be followed to guarantee a stable society. In 
previous “Found-a-village” projects, those two cleav-
ages always represented major conflicts. The conge-
nial method to analyze student-to-student debates 
in “classroom governments” and “model cities” is 
Toulmin’s argumentation pattern (see also Nussbaum 
2002).
2.  Argumentation analysis as method for 
Civic Education classroom studies
Traditionally the Toulmin model is used for teaching 
composition in German or English classes and for the 
training of rhetorical skills (see e.g. Geißner 1975, Fulk-
erson 1996). Recently it was also applied in qualita-
tive educational research, mainly in order to analyze 
episodes of oral argumentation. Especially in Science 
Education we can talk about a broadly established 
method to analyze individual and collective learn-
ing processes (see Krummheuer, Naujok 1999; Duschl, 
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Osborne 2002; Simon 2008; overview in Cavagnetto 
2010). One main aim is to foster teachers’ competence 
to diagnose their students’ tacit knowledge and to 
scaffold students’ argumentation. 
The Toulminian model operationalizes the argu-
mentation process as a mental movement from data 
through a warrant to a claim, sometimes supported 
by a backing (Toulmin 1958, Fulkerson 1996). As ev-
eryday communication rarely realizes explicitly all rel-
evant parts of reasoning, the model provides a tool to 
reconstruct even implicit parts of statements. First I 
will introduce the classical model which I will adapt 
later on for Civic Education purposes:
Fig. 3:  The complete Toulmin model 
(Fulkerson 1996, 21)
(D)ata Therefore (Q)ualifier (C)laim
Unless
(R)eservation
Since
(W)arrant
Because
(B)acking
1.  The claim is a controversial statement or a con-
clusion that must be supported by the evidence 
provided within the argument. It is an assertion 
about what exists or about values and underlying 
emotions that people hold. Though claims seem 
easy to recognize, they are often heavily co-con-
structed so that it might already be complicated to 
reconstruct which topics speakers are (not) talking 
about (see Lundsford 2002).
2.  The ground (also known as evidence, data or argu-
ment) consists of any information that will sup-
port the claim. Grounds can be based on statistics, 
quotations, reports or findings that are commonly 
shared in the communicative context. They must 
be regarded as valid or at least as likely.
3.  The warrant logically connects or relates the non-
controversial ground to the controversial claim. The 
evidence must be relevant, pertinent to the claim, 
and so the warrant justifies its presence within the 
argument. The warrant is typically unstated.
4.  The backing serves to support the warrant, explain-
ing what the claim’s assumptions are rooted in. It 
represents sort of a “universal premise” to “justify 
the justification”. Like the warrant it remains most-
ly implicit.
5.  The rebuttal anticipates any potential objection to 
or restriction of the argument.
6.  The qualifier increases or decreases the amount of 
certainty or scope of the claim by words such as 
sometimes, often, potentially, perhaps, and few.
The basic parts of Toulmin’s model – claim, warrant, 
ground, and backing or premise – can easily be used 
to re-describe assimilation and accommodation pro-
cesses of conceptual change in the tradition of Piaget 
(see Miller 1987, 1996). A simple claim shows an indi-
vidual’s assimilation to a certain point of view, induc-
ing the individual not to pay much attention to devel-
oping alternative ways of arguing. This “confirmatory 
bias” and “weak situational modeling” of everyday 
argumentation (Davies 2009) can be perturbated 
(disturbed) by rebuttals, provoking either changes of 
opinion or the search for a better and deeper judg-
ment as accommodation. When students are encour-
aged – by the teacher or by their classmates – to look 
for evidence against their own ideas and to consider 
alternative possibilities, they normally ameliorate 
their argumentation. This is also the outcome of one 
of the few argumentation studies within the domain 
of Social Studies (see Nussbaum 2002).
The lack of argumentation studies in Civic Educa-
tion is even more striking as argumentation repre-
sents a basic tool or key competence of democratic 
thinking and acting. A “strong democracy” (Barber 
1984) is necessarily a deliberative one where every 
individual’s controversial claim has to be justified by 
a collectively accepted and relevant reason. To weigh 
up arguments is a genuine peaceful way of reification 
of conflicts by finding common grounds and by creat-
ing mutual understanding, compromise or consensus 
(see also Lundsford 2002). Thus, argumentation analy-
sis is the genuine method for “needed studies” on the 
development of students’ conceptual knowledge and 
attitudes through discussions in the “open classroom” 
(Hahn 2010, 17).
Unlike some doubts if Toulmin’s model can be 
used to analyze interactive challenge-response-
moves (Leitão 2001), several convincing interactive 
variations are possible (e.g. Miller 1996; Krummheuer, 
Naujok 1999). My own approach can be assigned to 
reconstructive educational research following the 
framework of the so-called Documentary Method 
(Bohnsack 2010). By analyzing narrative interviews, 
group discussions, pictures etc. researchers want 
to reconstruct how social reality is produced in ac-
cordance to the actors’ perspective. So we deal 
with a constructivist stance. In the tradition of Karl 
Mannheim’s Sociology of Knowledge the “genesis” or 
ongoing negotiation and accomplishment of mean-
ing gets examined by focusing on tacit knowledge 
implied in practice. The so-called “documentary 
meaning” goes beyond the simple “immanent” or lit-
eral meaning of statements, trying to uncover their 
“implicit socio-genetic sense” by means of theoreti-
cal explication. In my case, the knowledge about 
possible contents and development stages of politi-
cal ideology is crucial to interpret students’ hidden 
premises about politics.
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3.  Warrants as plausible argument strategies
The core of an argument is its warrant, as it links in-
dividual and collectively shared claims. In contrast 
to Aristotelian Syllogism, Toulmin radically rejected 
formal logics as the main criteria for the quality of 
naturally occurring language. He promoted the no-
tion of plausibility and adequacy in a certain context 
rather than universal criteria. With his emphasis on 
field-dependence, Toulmin is very much compatible 
with contemporary qualitative research.
There are several attempts to classify typical war-
rants. In the US-American context, many authors refer 
to Fulkerson’s (1996) six types of argument strategies, 
known under their acronym “GASCAP”. Kienpointner 
(1992, 1996) distinguishes 30 argumentation patterns 
that he subdivides into nine “main classes” of every-
day argumentation. In my own adaption for political 
argumentation (Petrik 2007) I modeled six main class-
es comprising both Fulkerson’s and Kienpointner’s 
strategies:
Fig. 4:  Different classifications of current 
argumentation patterns
Fulkerson 1996 Kienpointner 1996 Petrik 2007
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1.  Definitional and subsumptive argumentation: An 
often underestimated strategy especially in politi-
cal argumentation. The claim gets connected to a 
special context by definition or subsumption, like 
in Proudhon’s left-libertarian phrase “property is 
theft” or in the conservative slogan “abortion is 
murder”. As theft and murder are connoted neg-
atively, property and abortion should be as well. 
Another famous example is Theodore Roosevelt’s 
“Americanism” speech of 1915, where he re-defined 
Americanism as patriotic performance and there-
fore as a consequent willingness to enter World 
War I. If you are a true American, you have to par-
ticipate (see Nash 2009). A typical rebuttal would 
put into question the stringency of the definition-
al links.
2.  Exemplary or generalizing argumentation: A very 
common form of reasoning, assuming that what is 
true of a well chosen case or single event is likely 
to hold for a larger group. The case or event must 
contain generalizable messages or coherences that 
support the claim. Quantitative and qualitative re-
search with polls and case studies provides us with 
insights in typicality. Every day experience is a fur-
ther common, but less reliable source of generaliza-
tion.
3.  Comparative, analogical or contrastive argumenta-
tion: In general, comparisons aim at working out 
similarities and differences of related or similar 
phenomena. “Why doesn’t Germany abandon its 
tiered school system, considering the fact that al-
most all Western countries have a comprehensive 
system?” Analogies are special kinds of indirect 
comparisons of two contexts that aren’t clearly 
linked together. A common form are historical 
analogies, for example of the 2008 finance crisis 
and the stock market crash of 1929, e.g. to warn 
people about possible anti-democratic conse-
quences. Contradictions are often used to rebut 
an argumentation by saying, when you say A, you 
can’t say B at the same time: “How can you be a 
conservative and at the same time agree with the 
demolition of this Art Nouveau house to replace it 
by an office building?”
4.  Causal Argumentation: Causal reasoning is one of 
the most frequent and most complex forms of war-
rants. An argument by causation needs the scien-
tific knowledge if a given occurrence is the result 
of, or it is affected by the factor X. A causal argu-
mentation against the claim to ban abortion could 
be: “Western Europe has one of the lowest average 
abortion rates because of a combination of liberal 
laws, early sex education and family programs. 
Apparently it’s not abortion bans that minimize 
abortion”. The typical danger is to confuse corre-
lation and causation: When in a country a certain 
ethnic minority such as, e.g., Turkish immigrants 
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or Germans of Turkish origin in Germany, commit 
statistically more crimes, this wouldn’t mean at all 
that those people are generally more criminal than 
Germans without an immigration background. In 
fact, not the ethnic background is the cause, but 
the social situation as a third factor: When you 
relate social background and criminality, you will 
get about the same results for Germans and Turk-
ish immigrants or Germans of Turkish origin. Ar-
gumentation via signs or clues is a special form of 
causation applied when only symptoms or effects 
are perceptible, but the cause has to be supposed 
or extrapolated.
5.  Functional argumentation: Functional or means-pur-
pose-relations represent a special case of causality 
directed towards a future goal. Especially in politi-
cal discussions certain measures are claimed to be 
an appropriate “remedy” for a certain social prob-
lem. Often, a commonly shared objective is used 
to justify unpopular or controversial means: Are 
lower taxes for big business the right tool to cre-
ate new jobs through new investments? Or should 
governments rather raise taxes for higher incomes 
in order to increase the lower classes’ economic de-
mand by higher welfare rates? A counter-argument 
can either question the adequacy of means or re-
ject the purpose.
6.  Authoritative or normative argumentation: This pat-
tern is a high-risk abbreviation-strategy. Especially 
if you rely on a cultural or even religious authority 
you can’t convince anyone who doesn’t accept the 
authority as such. On the other hand, a normative 
argumentation can also refer to celebrities, scien-
tists or scholars that are broadly acknowledged. 
Third, social norms, existing laws or commonly ac-
cepted principles can be applied.
Fig 5:  Plausible warrants: Six common argument strategies (Petrik 2007)
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4.  Levels of argumentation of political 
judgment and conflict resolution
There are several ideas for quality levels of argumen-
tation. An analytical framework for science educa-
tion assumes that the quality of argumentation in-
creases with the number of Toulmin’s elements (see 
Erduran, Simon, Osborne 2004, 928). Level 1 repre-
sents a simple claim versus a counter-claim, level 2 
includes either data, warrants or backings, level 3 a 
series of claims or counterclaims with a weak rebut-
tal, level 4 a claim with a clearly identifiable rebuttal 
and level 5 an extended argument with more than 
one rebuttal. 
I find it generally convincing that a higher degree 
of the elements’ explicit realization has to do with the 
quality of argumentation. However, especially level 2 
strikes me as a random choice of either data, warrants 
or backings, as if those elements were on the same 
intellectual level. Second, the warrant’s and backing’s 
role on higher levels remains unclear and also their 
possible connection. For the analysis of political argu-
ments this framework remains too formal and quan-
titative.
Two further, quite similar approaches are coming 
from Business Studies and Geography Education (see 
Davies 2009), suggesting a scaffolding process in-
spired by Vygotsky’s Zone of Proximal Development. 
This concept considers the difference between what a 
learner can do without help and under teacher guid-
ance. The common core of both criteria catalogues 
“for improving arguments” looks like the following:
0. No argument to back the claim 
1. One reason to support the claim 
2. More than one reason (contradicting or adding up?) 
3. Limitations to the reasons (rebuttals) 
4.  Relation of used reasons, considered by a wider 
viewpoint
5. Weighing up the strength of the evidence
There we find indeed a qualitative formal progression. 
It can be reframed with Bybees (1997) four levels of 
scientific literacy, in order to integrate the quality of 
the use of scientific knowledge: from a simple claim 
(nominal level) to relevant grounds and the rebuttal 
of counter-claims (functional level) over to the “objec-
tive” coordination of conflicting claims (procedural 
and conceptual level) to a meta-reflection of the argu-
mentation process (multidimensional level, but in a 
less generalized way than Bybee defines it). 
My own approach (see Petrik 2007, 2011a) is com-
patible with this one, adding a content-based gra-
dation for political reasoning following the nature 
of political thought and Kohlberg’s (1981) stages of 
moral development (based on Behrmann, Grammes, 
Reinhardt 2004). In the following, I will outline 
my proposition of four levels of argumentation 
that equally apply to critical judgment and conflict 
resolution skills, which I see, according to my previ-
ous research, in a dialectical relationship (see Petrik 
2011a). The more students reflect on their own and 
conflicting value orientations, the better they can ar-
gue with dissenters; the more they are open for con-
structive conflict resolution, the faster they will be 
able to question and elaborate their personal value 
system.
Private level (1): The unfounded claim as pre-political 
and dissociating value-orientation
This level is defined by unfounded, only individu-
ally valid claims revealing a mostly unreflecting, of-
ten deeply emotionally rooted value orientation. It 
remains private, pre-political in so far as the speaker 
isn’t willing or able (yet) to justify his or her concern 
to others. This stage involves a peer-centered perspec-
tive of dissociation with controversial opinions, lead-
ing either to the ignorance of existing conflicts or to 
verbal attacks of “dissidents”. Though this stage is 
indispensable for finding peer-membership and devel-
oping a political orientation, it mostly results in un-
founded dissents or verbal fights.
Public level (2): Relevant grounds as basis for the con-
structive exchange of political viewpoints 
Using grounds with relevant warrants represents 
the base of political exchange, because an individual 
statement gets plausibly connected to collectively 
accepted insights. As to political judgment, a sub-
stantiated viewpoint is reached. Combined with the 
openness to understand others stating their views a 
“founded dissent” can be achieved. So we could dis-
tinguish between two public sublevels: the ability a) 
to use relevant reasons to state one’s own view, b) to 
reconstruct opposed reasons of others.
Institutional level (3): Reflection of premises as coordi-
nation of conflicting claims
On the third level, one’s own arguments and rel-
evant counter-arguments get examined for under-
lying premises. Those are mostly unstated basic 
assumptions or backings as “justifications of the 
justification”. The first sublevel is the ability to dis-
close and contrast one’s own and opposing values 
and assumptions that underlie the formal warrant, 
taking a “wider viewpoint”. Since hidden ideological 
structures of the argumentation get considered, we 
can talk about a conceptual level of judgment ability. 
The second sublevel represents the ability to coor-
dinate conflicting ideological concepts by rebuttal, 
compromise or consent. Here a procedural or delib-
erative level is reached, implying the insight into the 
need to find common principles and methods to es-
tablish common decisions. This procedural “polity”-
orientation leads me to call this the institutional 
level, since democratic institutions have mainly the 
task to peacefully negotiate and deliberate opposed 
political concepts.
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Systemic level (4): Meta-reflection as empathic intellec-
tual perspective
This fourth level needs theoretical knowledge about 
ideologies and conflict resolution. The highest level of 
political judgment can be described with Rorty’s (1989) 
“Liberal Ironist”, a person able to combine the conscious-
ness of the contingency of their own ideology with the 
will to stand up for their values. The tolerance of am-
biguity coming along with this stance is the self-ironic 
distance to oneself, necessary to stay open for liberal 
(in the sense of deliberative) dialogue. Basic knowledge 
about typical political cleavages and possible coalitions 
of political ideologies (see above) is indispensable for 
this intellectual level (see Petrik 2010). On the other 
hand, to be able to evaluate political discussions on this 
level, basic knowledge about argumentation strategies 
(claim, ground, warrant, premise) is required.
The following figure summarizes the four levels of 
argumentation both for political judgment and for 
conflict resolution skills:
Fig. 6:  A Toulmin-based model for the development of political 
judgment and conflict resolution skills
1. Controversial claim 
Individually valid statement 
(Thesis, demand, conclusion, 
attack) 
2. Ground/Data 
Collectively valid statement 
(adequate, “true” or “probable” evi- 
dence, rebuttal of counter-claims) 
3. Premise (Backing, underlying assumptions, concepts & procedures)  
Founding of the ground(s), political values & common principles  
Warrant 
Argument strategy 
Subsumptive, functional, 
exemplary, causal, analo- 
gical, normative…  
Political judgment level 1: 
Private dissociation 
Bias, opinion, unreflecting 
value-orientation 
Political judgment level 2: 
Public exchange 
Substantiated political 
viewpoint 
Political judgment level 3: 
“Institutional” perspective, coordination of conflicting claims, “ideology” 
Procedure-oriented reflection of one’s own and opposing value-systems 
4. Meta-analysis as theoretical, systemic approach  
Evaluation by means of social science-based knowledge 
Conflict resolution level 2: 
Founded dissent (tolerance) 
Conflict resolution level 1:  
Unfounded dissent (“fight”) 
Conflict resolution level 3: 
Negotiation & deliberation: compromise, consent or majority decision 
Conflict resolution level 4: 
Evaluation of the discussions’ failure & success by analyzing claims, grounds, warrants & premises 
Political judgment level 4: 
“Intellectual” perspective, “Liberal ironist” (self-criticism & political compassion)  
Coordination of conflicting ideologies by using theoretical knowledge (e.g. cleavage-theory) 
In the following two chapters I will apply this argu-
mentation model to two constitutive village meet-
ings of two 8th grade classes’ that participated in 
“Found-a-village”-projects. Both classes belong to the 
same urban grammar school (Gymnasium) in Germany. 
I myself was their teacher. The projects took place in 
2004 and 2006 (for details about my data collection 
see Petrik 2011a). I will focus on segments of debates 
dealing with the procedural and the distributive di-
mension, with the communities’ decision-making and 
resource allocation. For the latter, it is important to 
know, that the students drew lots to get a personal 
“monthly income” (play money) according to the aver-
age distribution of wealth of Western countries. There-
fore, at the beginning of the simulation, there is a 
lower, middle and upper class. Of course, the students 
are completely free to re-arrange this “mainstream”-
distribution.
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5.  Argumentation analysis I: The 
serious and “public” Village One
At the beginning of the first village meeting, Paul 
gets very quickly appointed as moderator to lead 
the discussion. Separately of this task some students 
muse about the need of a mayor. This is the moment 
when the first controversy arises. (In the following, I 
always start with the original German transcription to 
provide then an English translation):
Kerstin: Ich finde, wenn wir nen Dorfmeister haben, der 
darf dann aber nicht alleine entscheiden [Durcheinander]
Lars: Wir machen eine Dorfjury. [Durcheinander]
Manuel: Wir wäre es, wenn aus jedem Haus einer bestimmt 
wird und die sich dann zusammensetzen und dann die Ver-
treter die Meinung der Häuser vertreten?
Paul: Das finde ich gut.
Lars: Das finde ich auch.
Paul: Wollen wir das mal abstimmen, wer ist dagegen, dass 
wir etwas anderes machen? Wer ist gegen Manuel und will 
etwas anderes machen? Ja, jetzt wollt ihr wohl alle, dass wir 
das machen.
Marcus: Nein, das ist dumm. Ich finde das dumm.
Paul: Ja, dann sag doch was.
Marcus: Ja, weil der eine, der dann immer bestimmt und der 
eine sagt ...
Kerstin: Nein, der bestimmt nicht. Ja, der vertritt die ...
Marcus: ... ja, der vertritt die, aber...
Paul: Manuel, erklärst du noch mal deine Idee?
Manuel: Ja, der vertritt die. Im Haus wird dann besprochen, 
was man als nächstes, wenn die sich treffen, zusammen 
macht und da vertritt er eben nur die Meinung. Und jedes 
Haus kann bestimmen, welche. […]
Birte: Ich melde mich. Nein, ich finde, der sollte schon auch, 
also der Vertreter, der sollte dann auch regelmäßig gewech-
selt werden, irgendwie jeden Monat oder alle zwei Wochen.
Paul: Aber das kann man dann auch hausintern besprechen. 
Ja OK, also dann sind alle dafür. [...]
Kerstin: I think, if we have a mayor, he mustn’t decide on 
his own. [Chaos]
Lars: We’ll have a village jury. [Chaos]
Manuel: How about electing one guy in each house and 
they would gather around and then represent the house’s 
opinion as representatives?
Paul: I think this is good.
Lars I think so, too.
Paul: Could we vote on that, who is against that we do so-
mething different. Who is against Manuel and wants to do 
something different? OK, now all of you want us to do this.
Marcus: No, this is stupid. I find this stupid.
Paul: OK, so tell us something.
Marcus: OK, because the one who is always deciding and 
the one says…
Kerstin: No, he doesn’t decide. Yes, he represents the…
Marcus: … yes, he represents them, but…
Paul: Manuel, could you re-explain your idea?
Manuel: Yes, he represents them. Then, inside the house, 
will be discussed what to do next together, when they meet 
and there he only represents the view.
Birte: I put my hand up. No, I think, the one should also, I 
mean the representative, he should also be changed regu-
larly, somehow every month or every two weeks.
Paul: But this can be discussed within the houses. OK, so 
everybody is for it.
Village One (procedural dimension): Representative or grassroots council?
Kerstin raises a counter-claim against the traditional 
idea of a powerful mayor. Taking this role, nobody 
should be able to decide on his own. Her claim re-
mains unjustified, probably because she believes that 
the others share her opinion. We can assume an im-
plicit liberal or egalitarian value orientation opposed 
to a conservative hierarchical approach. In fact, no-
body contradicts her thesis. Instead Manuel proposes 
a representative system as a possible solution for 
her claim. His argumentation uses a functional war-
rant, as he considers a representative council as an 
appropriate means to decrease individual political 
power. His premise that such a council would be able 
to integrate everybody’s interests remains unstated. 
Nevertheless he achieves consent. Paul quickly asks 
to vote for the proposal, explicitly demanding rejec-
tions to it. Obviously he wants to promote possible 
alternative suggestions, aiming at coordinating claim 
and counter-claim, although no deep controversy has 
arisen yet. Accordingly Paul’s moderation reaches al-
ready the public level (2), with potential transition to 
the institutional one (3).
Now, Marcus (probably encouraged by Paul’s mod-
eration) gives an emotional counter-claim: to him the 
idea of representatives is stupid. Paul, confirming his 
moderation abilities by not accepting an unfounded 
claim, asks for a reason. Marcus then seems to be us-
ing a causal rebuttal: The representative would be au-
thorized to decide for his house alone and would, as a 
result, disempower those he speaks for. Although Mar-
cus doesn’t clearly state his worry, the term “decide” 
already initiates Kerstin to interrupt him by insuring 
that according to her, representation doesn’t include 
the power of decision. Though she is using a defini-
tional counter-argumentation, Marcus isn’t satisfied 
yet, probably because he understands the term rep-
resentation in the Western countries’ liberal tradition 
as a form of power with a free mandate. Obviously 
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this free mandate doesn’t fit his unstated grassroots 
democracy value base. As neither Kerstin nor Marcus 
explicitly define their central terms, their possible 
consent or dissent remains unfounded at this point.
Paul who still takes his role very seriously tries to 
promote reification, gets back to Manuel, inviting 
him to re-explain his initial idea. Manuel clarifies his 
position: the house-communities decide and the repre-
sentative “only” embodies their previously fixed view. 
Manuel defines a kind of grassroots-council whose rep-
resentatives are endowed with an imperative mandate, 
meaning that elected representatives are to execute 
the will of those who elected them. But Birte isn’t satis-
fied yet, postulating a rotation system for the represen-
tatives. Like Marcus she doesn’t apply a clear warrant. 
Her argumentation contains an implicit comparison of 
different measures (types of council) to implement the 
common political goal “everybody decides”. The exact 
functional reason for a rotation system remains un-
stated, probably appearing too obvious to Birte in this 
context of people who think in a similar way. The rota-
tion system Birte suggests is a genuine left-libertarian 
idea that was practiced by the German Green Party 
during their first legislative period in the Bundestag 
between 1983 and 1987, where every representative 
had to be replaced after two years. At the end of the 
topic “mayor” Paul notes that a possible rotation sys-
tem should be decided individually within the houses 
and concludes this debate by stating a final consent 
about Manuel’s proposition. A new topic is raised.
This first “procedural” controversy during the 
constitutive village meeting is not about different 
government systems. The students rather debate 
the question how the common “grassroots premise” 
could be transformed into practical politics (func-
tional warrants): What kind of counsil do we want? 
The whole debate remains consequently on the sec-
ond public level where different relevant arguments 
aiming at a grassroots democracy are exchanged. Al-
though not every ground and warrant gets fully elabo-
rated, students mostly seem to understand mutually 
their argumentations. Apparently willing to establish 
a common ideological base the speakers succeed in 
clarifying misunderstandings and quickly reach a con-
sensus about their governmental structures.
But as their underlying premises about the neces-
sity of grassroots democracy and about potential 
dangers of a liberal representative system or an au-
thoritarian mayor aren’t stated and discussed, the 
consensus could only be superficial and therefore 
temporary. Without being the result of weighing 
up different value systems, and considering at the 
same time the policy and polity dimension a stable 
level-three consensus cannot be acquired. Hence, this 
consent is likely to be challenged later on: by expe-
riencing its practical impacts (as it is less effective), 
by contradicting students who didn’t raise their voice 
yet, or by realizing that their common understanding 
of representation is more controversial than the dis-
cussion suggested so far.
In the following, the class discusses economical 
topics like possible and necessary professions within 
the village community. The first serious disagreement 
occurs when a student proposes establishing a com-
mon fund where every villager deposits a part of his 
income. At this point, Anja opens the dispute:
Village One (distributive dimension): Communal or private property?
Anja: Aber was sollen wir denn für das ganze Dorf kaufen?
Paul: Alles Mögliche, Bibliotheken, Supermarkt, ...
Carsten: Hochspannungsleitung, Telefonanschlüsse ...
Paul: ... Saatgut, Samen für den Dingsda, Acker. [Durchein-
ander]
Thorsten: Das kann man doch auch selber kaufen.
Ramona: Ich find’s eigentlich besser, dass man jetzt den Sa-
men selber kauft.
Regina: Ja, aber es gibt noch die Telefonleitungen und alles 
Mögliche.
Birte: Hallo, wenn mal etwas kaputt geht oder so, ist doch 
Scheiße. [Durcheinander] Ja, oder zum Beispiel Medikamen-
te. Wenn jemand krank wird [...]
Ramona: ... ja, aber wenn niemand von uns krank wird und 
wir dafür bezahlt haben und auch nicht das Telefon kaputt 
geht ... [...]
John: […] Und ich denke, dass man um Geld nicht irgendwie 
abstimmen kann, dass man eine Dorfkasse macht. Weil im 
normalen Leben kann man auch nicht sagen, ich will jetzt 
Geld haben, gib mir was.
Anja: But what should we buy for the entire village?
Paul: Lots of things, library, supermarket, ...
Carsten: Electricity, telephone lines...
Paul: ... Seeds for the thing, farmland. [Chaos]
Thorsten: Everybody could buy this by himself.
Ramona: I think it‘s better to buy the seeds for oneself.
Regina: OK, but there are the telephone lines and lots of 
other things.
Birte: No kidding, if something gets broken or so, would be 
bullshit! Yes, or medication. If someone is getting ill. [...]
Ramona: Yes, but if nobody’s getting ill and we paid for it 
and also the telephone doesn’t get broken… [...]
John: And I think you can’t vote on money to get a commu-
nal fund. Because in normal life you can’t say either, I want 
to have money now, give me some.
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Anja’s counter-claim contains an implicit functional 
argumentation: There is no need for communal cash 
because there is no need to buy something for the 
entire village. Paul and Carsten refute her claim by 
listing several infrastructural essentials. But the most 
important part of their functional reasoning remains 
unstated: “Those investments are too expensive for 
individuals”. As a consequence, Ramona and Thorsten 
support Anja’s view by a simple unjustified counter-
claim: Everybody or every house-community could 
buy seeds and so on independently. This call for 
economical independence could express the two stu-
dents’ need of autonomy and individuality – a need 
appropriate to an age concerned by the detachment 
of all kinds of authorities.
Regina then approves Paul’s and Carsten’s concern 
by repeating one of their examples. Now Birte starts 
an emotional attack on the adversaries of a communal 
fund. I will analyze her argumentation in detail. She 
defends the common cash idea with two functional 
arguments concerning the village’s future: Something 
could break down, somebody could get sick. Both are 
factually correct and linked to her claim – a fund as 
means to finance medical care and reparations. By 
 using two relevant grounds she reaches the public lev-
el of political judgment. The weak point for possible 
counter-claims of a level-two-argumentation is not the 
warrant; it can’t be refused for formal reasons. In this 
case, the analysis of underlying premises is crucial to 
fully understand Birte’s political judgment. First she 
seems to assume that a village council can’t function 
without collective money, as otherwise infrastructural 
measures wouldn’t be possible. In this premise she 
shows already a basic understanding of central gov-
ernmental tasks and their material base: to establish 
and to maintain the common good. Without taxation 
(democratic) politics is impossible. At the same time, 
her argumentation contains a second controversial 
premise concerning specific governmental tasks like 
healthcare: Health, according to Birte, has to be a public 
affair, can’t be left to individual responsibility. As we 
know especially from the recent US-American debate, 
this left-libertarian or democratic-socialist claim can be 
highly controversial. As her premises remain unstated 
and, therefore, unjustified, her understanding of the 
state’s infrastructural and distributive role could be 
questioned easily. So we get the following argumenta-
tion scheme (grey arrows hint at implicit parts):
Fig. 7: Birte’s argumentation on the “public” level: Substantiated political viewpoint
Claim 
We need a communal 
fund for our village! 
Grounds 
Warrant 
Functional argumentation: 
Fund as means to finance 
medical care and reparations 
Major weak point for 
counter-claims: 
Unstated distributive 
premise (healthcare) 
1. Something could get broken 
2. Somebody could get ill
Premises as basic assumptions, values, democratic principles (here: implicit)  
1. The village council needs collective money to maintain the common good 
 Understanding of necessary governmental tasks and their necessary material base (taxes)  
2. Illness and reparations are a common task not to be left to individual responsibility 
 Possible left-libertarian or democratic-socialist value base (controversial distributive position)
 “Public” level (2): 
Two relevant reasons 
with unstated premises 
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Ramona’s rebuttal questions the factual base of Birte’s 
claim: It is likely that nothing could break down, no-
body could get sick. This argumentation pattern is 
very interesting. First, our human experience contra-
dicts the factual base of Ramona’s ground: There is 
no such paradise without diseases and deterioration. 
Factual contradiction represents the major weak point 
of an argument. So we can easily assume that in this 
class, Ramona’s false assertion of the absence of typi-
cal human problems couldn’t be maintained for a long 
time. Second, her implicit causal warrant “without 
illness no need for medical care” shows probably a 
certain rejection of the solidarity principle that most 
democracies are based on: Why should I pay into a 
common healthcare- fund if I don’t get sick? This po-
tentially radical market-liberal premise denies a mutu-
al responsibility, especially for the weaker members of 
society. To pursue this direction of political thought 
I will now analyze in detail John’s later market-liberal 
counter-argumentation to Birte’s position. Here a typi-
cal political misconception gets manifested.
John is strictly opposed to a communal fund for the 
village. He applies two arguments: First, using a nor-
mative argumentation pattern, he views it as impos-
sible to vote on money. The underlying premise sug-
gests that private property is generally no subject to 
political decision. This norm obviously doesn’t exist, 
since every political system has to be based on at least 
a minimal taxation – by taking money from people’s 
incomes. Despite the fact that John’s ground is irrele-
vant for his claim, we can impute a legitimate market-
liberal value-base in favor of private property rights 
and an opposition to public healthcare policies. The 
term “irrelevance” is a technical label for arguments 
without a plausible warrant. The speaker’s political 
position itself is not valued by this term at all. How-
ever, the denial of any kind of public fund remains a 
pre-political, “private” statement rather than a con-
troversial political position. This interpretation gets 
confirmed, when we look at John’s second ground that 
is analogical: In normal life you can’t ask for some-
body’s money. In other words: In real everyday life 
what Birte and others proclaim would simply be theft. 
This argument by itself is indeed factually true for the 
private context. But it is irrelevant for his claim, as 
John uses a warrant consisting of a false analogy: A 
democratically elected village council is in fact autho-
rized to urge money, since it represents an institution-
al and not a private setting. So John’s premise to or-
ganize the village’s politics according to the norms of 
private life can be rejected easily for factual reasons: 
Are taxes theft? How should governments work with-
out income? Second John could be criticized – but of 
course not factually – for his implicit (and legitimate!) 
market-liberal value-orientation: How fair is a private 
healthcare system to those who are poor? So we get 
the following argumentation scheme (grey arrows 
hint at implicit parts):
Fig. 8: John’s argumentation on the “private” level: Unreflecting value orientation
Claim 
No communal fund for 
our village! 
Grounds 
1. You can’t vote on money  
2. In normal life you can’t ask for 
somebody’s money 
Warrants 
1. Normative argumentation: 
   “Money vote” impossible 
2. Analogical argumentation: 
   Urging money would be 
   theft in everyday life 
Major weak points for 
counter-claims: 
Taxes = theft? Govern-
ment without taxes? Pri- 
vate healthcare = fair? 
1. Im Dorf soll alles wie im normalen (Privat-)Leben gemacht werden 
2. Politik darf nicht über privates Eigentum entscheiden 
 “Private” level (1): 
Two irrelevant 
warrants including 
one invalid ground 
Premises as basic assumptions, values, democratic principles (here: implicit) 
1. Private property is generally no subject for political decision 
 Incorrect norm: no politics without taxation; but possible market-liberal value orientation in 
     favor of private property rights and against public healthcare policies 
2. The village has to be organized like private everyday life and there urging money is theft 
 Inaccurate analogy between the private and the institutional sphere: 
       Democratic decisions (e.g. of the village council) about private property are legitimate  
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At the end of their first encounter the villagers estab-
lish indeed a communal fund – however it is based 
on a compromise: Only in case somebody gets sick 
or something breaks down, the council will collect 
money. For the most part, Village One shows a seri-
ous involvement in the simulation. The discussion 
stays mostly objective, there is almost no disorder, 
and emotional statements are directly linked to po-
litical issues. The discussion remains on the public 
level, with a final compromise pointing at the classes’ 
prospect to reach the institutional level. At the same 
time, students like John and Ramona still argue on a 
pre-political level – which is appropriate to their age. 
However, even John states more than simple claims: 
he tries hard to find arguments and might, due to his 
involvement, be encouraged to elaborate his “market-
liberal” values. 
6.  Argumentation analysis II: The 
playful and “private” Village Two
Right at the beginning of the first meeting, Thorsten 
and Joachim are sitting on the teacher’s desk. They 
just got promoted to moderate the first village meet-
ing. After a couple of side talks and during lots of cha-
otic verbal and non-verbal interaction between several 
subgroups (of mainly boys) Thorsten raises his voice:
Village Two (procedural dimension): Village ruler or team of representatives?
Thorsten: [laut, auf dem Pult sitzend und eine Schriftrolle 
entrollend, Joachim tut ihm gleich] Und wir wollen eine… 
hier so’n Dorfherrscher-Willen. [Unruhe, Zwischenrufe] Ir-
gendwelche, irgendwelche Fragen hier zu?
Joachim: So, noch Fragen? Ja.
Kassandra: Was für Regeln wollt ihr denn aufstellen?
Joachim: Ja, so was wie, ja so was wie Regeln halt.
Thorsten: Was passiert, wenn, wenn jemand mal was ver-
bricht, oder so, zum Beispiel...
Joachim: [lächelnd] Ja. So, Marc.
Nico: [laut] Die zehn Gebote... Mord! ...
Marc: Ich find, wir wählen nicht einen Dorfherrscher, son-
dern irgendwie so ein paar Leute, die das immer...
Nils: [laut] Eine Partei!
Joachim: Abgeordnete.
Nils: Eine Partei.
Joachim: Abgeordnete.
Marc: Ja.
Thorsten: Ja, sowas brauchen wir noch. [Unruhe] Ja, Lisa.
Lisa: Ich würd’ auch sagen, wie Marcus, wir sollten keinen 
Herrscher oder so halt bestimmen, sondern wie jetzt zum 
Beispiel jetzt...
Nils: Partei.
Lisa: Schul, Schul, Schul …
Ines: Hey, könnt ihr mal ruhig sein. [Zwischenruf: Nein!]
Fiona: Sch, Schul, Schulsprecher.
Lisa: Schulsprecher. Genau, dass wir sozusagen so ein Team 
haben.
Thorsten: [loudly, sitting on the teacher’s desk enrolling 
a scroll, Joachim doing the same] And we want a … here… 
such a village ruler’s will [Chaos, interjections] Any, any 
questions to this?
Joachim: OK, any questions left? Yes.
Kassandra: But what kind of rules do you want to establish?
Joachim: Yes, something like, simply like rules.
Thorsten: What happens, if somebody commits a crime or 
so, for example…
Joachim: [smiling] Yes. OK, Marc.
Nico: [loudly] The Ten Commandments… murder!
Marc: I think, we shouldn’t elect a village ruler but some-
how some people who always…
Nils [loudly] A party!
Joachim: Representatives.
Nils: A party.
Joachim: Representatives.
Marc: Yes.
Thorsten: Yes, we still need something like that. [Chaos] Yes, 
Lisa.
Lisa: I would say, like Marcus, we shouldn’t appoint a ruler 
or something like that but like for example…
Nils: … party…
Lisa: … School… school… school…
Ines: Hey, could you shut up. [Interjection: no!]
Fiona: Sch… school… school council representatives.
Lisa: School council representatives. Exactly, so we get a 
team.
Thorsten and Joachim claim to establish a “ruler’s 
will” – accompanied by Thorsten’s ceremonial voice 
and the theatre-like gesture to enroll a scroll that re-
minds of Roman emperors declaring a new law. The 
whole scenery appears more like an ironic citation of 
a historical stereotype than a serious claim within 
a students’ village. Kassandra’s question about pos-
sible rules seems to embarrass Joachim. Instead of 
giving a reason, he simply repeats Thorsten’s claim: 
Rulers proclaim rules, that’s it, a simple and well-
known convention. This answer strengthens the 
impression that the moderation team isn’t capable 
of taking their task seriously. They seem to prefer 
playing a non-democratic ruler’s role without prob-
ably believing in it. Their premise could be: this vil-
lage isn’t real, it’s like one of these historical role 
games we know from history classes (which they do 
indeed, as I know). So they misjudge the simulation 
character of the village situation. As their teacher I 
initially asked the students not to play a role but to 
act realistically, as if they had to set up a real village 
community.
But then Thorsten adds “crime” as a valid ground 
for rules, as means to determine sanctions. Nico in-
terjects two more examples: the Ten Commandments 
as pre-political, historical set of rules and murder as a 
sort of crime – which is, however, unlikely to happen 
in this class. His interjections support Joachim’s and 
Thorsten’s attitude to treat the simulation as a funny 
role game.
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The content of these claims could hint at a (still) 
negative image of politics: Instead of regarding the 
village-council primarily as a chance of a restart, as a 
constructive institution to design their own commu-
nity, a possibility to establish certain rights, activities, 
economic essentials and political visions, they define 
its dangers such as breaches of the rules, without talk-
ing about rules first. Without knowing the three boys’ 
latent value orientation, we can notice them creating 
a conservative view on politics where “man is a wolf 
to [his fellow] man”. 
But then Marc’s claim – like Kassandra’s before – 
draws the attention back to the “real” village with its 
real community. While proposing that “some people” 
should be in charge of the village’s political power, 
Marc undermines both the idea of a single ruler and 
of a historical role game. Nils sticks to his one-word 
interjections but his associations reach now the realm 
of democracy: a political party could rule the village. 
Joachim throws in a simple counter-claim: not a party 
but representatives. Nico repeats his claim once more, 
Joachim does the same with his one. There we have 
a typical claim-versus-claim situation, but without a 
real controversy. Both boys seem to continue playing 
rather than arguing: This time they stage an ironic 
verbal contest about political terms without really 
trying to define their understanding or to discuss dif-
ferent institutional options. 
Yet, Thorsten seems to take his moderation role a 
little bit more seriously. Lisa picks up Marc’s claim us-
ing the school’s representative council as analogical 
argument for a possible village government. But as 
almost half of the boys are engaged in side talks or 
throwing things around, she can’t express her concern 
without difficulty. Ines assists her by admonishing 
the boys to be silent and Fiona helps her by complet-
ing her argument. In doing so, the village-girls and 
Marc (as the only really seriously arguing boy) succeed 
in establishing the idea of a five people village-council. 
However in the following, the meeting doesn’t real-
ly get more serious. The class spends half of their time 
electing five students (Lisa, Thorsten, Joachim, Mela-
nie, Moritz) – in a chaotic and ineffective way. The oth-
er half is used to discuss possible jobs, nutrition and a 
new name for the village. Those topics again represent 
rather a casting-show, a competition about the ques-
tion who is the funniest boy in the class than a serious 
political or economic discussion. Consequently the vil-
lage council doesn’t come to any decision. Only at the 
end of the lesson the topic money comes up:
Village Two (distributive dimension): The poor clean up the rich men’s houses
Nils: Ich will mein Geld wiederhaben, das mir gestohlen 
wurde.
Marcus: Ey, Nils…
Melanie: [laut] Ja Mann, Nils, wir wissen nicht, wer das ge-
klaut hat…
Joachim: Wir werden…
Melanie: … Und da können wir auch nichts machen, Pech 
gehabt.
Joachim: Du brauchst, du braucht einen ähm…[Unruhe]
Melanie: Wir kennen unsere Klasse …
Dilan: Ich schenk dir nen Fünfziger, damit du auch Geld 
hast. Hier.
[...]
Melanie: Ich wollte sagen, dass unser Dorf ... von den Mit-
telreichen, wir bieten noch an, dass wir bei den Reichen 
putzen.
Thorsten: Also könnt ihr gemeinsam, hier… [?]
Moritz: Psch.
Lisa: Aber ihr bezahlt.
Dilan: Ja, fünfzig Euro pro Tag.
Lisa: Okay.
Pablo: Nee, ich geb nichts.
Dilan: Pro Woche.
Moritz: Ruhe!
Pablo: [lachend] Pro Monat. 
Dilan: Pro Woche.
Pablo: Pro Monat. 
Lisa: Okay.
Nils: I want to get my money back that got stolen.
Marc: Hey Nils.
Melanie: [loudly] Yes man, Nils, we don’t know who stole 
this…
Joachim: We’re going to…
Melanie: … And we can’t do anything about it, bad luck.
Joachim: You need, you need a … [Chaos]
Melanie: We know our class …
Dilan: I offer you 50 Euros so that you have some money, 
take. […]
Melanie: I wanted to say that our village… we, the middle 
rich people propose to do cleaning jobs at the rich people’s 
houses.
Thorsten: So you could together, here …
Moritz: psst!
Lisa: But you pay for it.
Dilan: Yes, 50 Euros a day.
Lisa: Okay.
Pablo: Nope, I don’t give anything.
Dilan: Per week.
Moritz: Quiet!
Pablo: [laughing] Per month.
Dilan: Per week.
Lisa: Okay.
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Nils continues the role play by complaining that his 
(play) money got stolen. Melanie, Joachim and Dilan 
take issue with him. Now Melanie offers to do cleaning 
jobs in the rich people’s houses. After that a little half-
ironic dispute arises about the payment that the “mid-
dle rich” would get for their cleaning activities. This 
is the only moment in the course of the entire meet-
ing where the village’s (and therefore indirectly the 
society’s) social inequality comes into play. Although 
‘cleaning up’ for the rich is a realistic job option, we 
can assume that those students, coming mostly from 
the middle and upper middle class, wouldn’t come up 
with the idea of earning their money by doing a clean-
ing job in real life. Hitherto, the play money seems 
to provoke the allusion of a funny Monopoly game. 
No discussion about individual incomes, let alone the 
funding of collective political structures occurs. The 
same lack of sobriety that the previous topic “govern-
ment” brought about is repeated within “economic” 
issues.
Conclusion: Two argumentative stages 
of political identity formation
Apparently we witness here two very different kinds 
of political awakening. The first class is prepared and 
motivated to fill the gap the teacher left when re-
nouncing at his normal guiding role. The students un-
derstand the village simulation as a real opportunity 
to state and negotiate political claims and to put into 
practice their own political ideas. The topics “council” 
and “communal fund” show a serious attempt to grasp 
the village as an institutional, therefore political and 
not only private setting. The controversy about these 
topics provokes the attempt to justify one’s stand-
point. Though some students don’t succeed yet in for-
mulating valid reasons they try at least to find some. 
Simple claim-to-claim-struggles are rare. Consequent-
ly the discussion level of a “stated consent” is quickly 
reached, building a starting point to deliberate and 
coordinate possible conflicting claims. The discus-
sion (not each individual, of course) has reached the 
public level of conflict resolution – though the classes’ 
consent about a governmental system might be only 
temporary. The general openness for mutual argu-
ments fosters both an atmosphere of tolerance and 
puts peaceful pressure on those refusing to state their 
views or those having difficulties in finding relevant 
grounds. Thus, the genetic setting seems to provoke 
an interactive political learning process whose major 
outcome is the discovery of the principle of solidarity. 
This discovery could be even more sustainable, since it 
was adopted independently of the teacher’s authority.
Contrary to the seriously debating “public” Village 
One, the second class doesn’t seem to consider the 
simulation yet as political, but rather as a private op-
portunity to break out of the everyday instructional 
setting. The elements of role games, castings shows 
and Monopoly – mostly launched by a handful of boys 
– serve mostly to have fun, to provoke laughter, and 
to impress the girls. Thus far the lack of teacher guid-
ance doesn’t set free clear political interests but is un-
derstood as an arena to fulfill personal needs. On the 
other hand, the game-like mood might also be a sign 
of the students’ protest against an excessive demand. 
Due to the absence of direct instructional scaffolding 
at the beginning of the simulation they might also 
reproduce the public stereotype of politics as theatre.
The lack of serious commitment resulting from 
that stance can also be observed on the formal level: 
The boys who lead the discussion almost always use 
(sometimes even ironically weakened) claim versus 
claim argumentations, without entering into reason-
ing. However there are a few moments where rebut-
tals provoke the search of relevant arguments. Espe-
cially some girls try to calm down the chaos in order 
to launch political options. Nevertheless they fail to 
change the prevailing game-like mood.
Yet on the whole this class remains on a private, pre-
political level of conflict resolution. This stage typical-
ly results in both the denial of indispensable conflicts 
and verbal fights as unfounded dissents. In this con-
text latent political values almost don’t get a chance 
to be expressed and elaborated. Obviously, this sec-
ond class will take a longer time to reach a public level 
of mutual acceptance than the first one did. 
What are the consequences of the genetic approach 
in Civic Education? Should we consider the village-
simulation’s openness as inappropriate for possibly 
overwhelmed, conflict-denying, chaotic or simply 
playful classes? No, on the contrary. Both, the “natu-
ral state” of the students’ society and their parody of 
“politics as theatre” provide in the long run the first 
deeply felt insights into the necessity of a (micro-)po-
litical organization. The own experience of collective 
chaos and failure goes along with the mutual critique 
of inappropriate behavior. This can have a much great-
er impact on the learning process than the well-known 
teacher authority – which can, during puberty, easier 
be ignored than the peers’ view.
Indeed, this second class, while watching video ex-
cerpts of their first village meeting in the next lesson, 
was shocked about their own behavior. Hence, they 
were now seeking to establish strict rules providing 
a constructive atmosphere, along with sanctions (like 
“fines” and – most efficient – the temporary exclusion 
of the debates) to ensure the observance of rules. In-
stead of the initial parody games around the topics 
of “crime” and “murder” the village community now 
faces an authentic negative starting problem: Their 
own pre-democratic behavior. Of course, it still took 
them a while to really develop a deliberative level of 
discussion. But the initial minority of seriously argu-
ing students did indeed increase over time. The pro-
vocative playful start expressed already a productive 
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“alienation effect” (Bertolt Brecht), provoking the stu-
dents to take new perspectives on themselves. 
The method of argumentation analysis seems indeed 
to be an adequate way to capture the dynamic forma-
tion process of political judgment and conflict resolu-
tion abilities in interactive settings. Above all, the qual-
ity of argumentation can be specified – often against 
our first impression. Especially unstated or slightly real-
ized arguments can mislead us to devalue a student’s 
argumentation. As to the case of Birte and John in 
Village One, two – at first sight –similarly simple argu-
mentations revealed quite different stages of political 
thinking. Implicit but important political insights can 
be “carved out” and seemingly relevant reasons could 
be unmasked as being still pre-political misperceptions.
At the same time, our comprehension of pre-
political, often times very emotional claims can be 
strengthened: By analyzing latent premises we get 
closer to students’ basic social values as fundamental 
parts of their identity formation. It is important to 
clearly distinguish between our diagnosis of a formal-
ly incomplete or implausible argumentation and our 
reconstruction of political emotions as latent point of 
views. This is what I would call a synthesis between 
a deficit- and a difference-oriented approach. The 
deficit-perspective is important for assisting students 
to progress in their ability to convince others and to 
change their views themselves – in other words: to 
become democratic citizens. The difference-perspec-
tive is important in so far as it enables teachers and 
scholars to recognize the students’ very individual ap-
proaches to develop political orientation.
I will continue my research using the “Found-a-Vil-
lage“ project for case studies to compare political ar-
gumentation patterns in different countries, starting 
with Germany, The United States and France. My first 
explorative study with German high school students 
led me to a first heuristics of eight “politicization types” 
which will I will differentiate and supplement in fur-
ther studies. I define a politicization type as “typical 
argumentation patterns depending on the individuals’ 
basic political value orientation” (see Petrik 2011a).
I hope this teaching example will encourage Civic 
Education teachers to experiment with open settings 
like the “Found-a-village”-project. In particular, so-
cially and culturally diverse classes might profit from 
the project’s typical moments of mutual self-correc-
tion. Of course teachers shouldn’t leave their students 
alone during possibly destructive debates; they have 
to provide argumentation scaffolding whenever the 
village community fails to find a solution on their 
own. However, teachers shouldn’t intervene too ear-
ly because their interference would impede the stu-
dents’ own effort and creativity during moments of 
“productive confusion” (Wagenschein). The interactive 
training of collective conflict resolution skills is a cru-
cial step to initiate value-debates fostering political 
identity development and democratic tolerance. 
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